Returning Officer Decision in relation to appeal received concerning:
Deputy Returning Officer (DRO) ruling on Sabbatical officers being required to take leave in order to campaign
I have been asked to consider an appeal against the ruling made by the DRO on 24 October 2025 that Sabbatical Officers are required to take leave in order to campaign. When considering this appeal, I have taken account of any relevant rules, evidence and arguments of which I am aware and of the grounds for the original decision.
In particular, in this instance I have referred to the following legislation, rules and guidance:
- Education Act 1994
- Cambridge SU Articles
- Cambridge SU By-Law 3
- Cambridge SU By-Law 8
- Cambridge SU By-Law 9
- Cambridge SU Election & Referendum Rules
- Cambridge SU Referendum, Michaelmas 2025 Campaigns Lead Briefing Note
The appeal includes 20 separate points, grouped under 5 headings. While I have read and considered each of the 20 points submitted to me, I do not intend to address each individually but will rather address the 5 heads of appeal.
1) The appeal suggests that the DRO has misunderstood the Education Act 1994 as well as provisions contained in the Cambridge SU Articles and By-Laws. The contention is that these regulatory documents only apply to Elections rather than Referenda.
The Education Act provides a very broad outline of the key expectations of a Students’ Union. In the 30 years since it was enacted, more detailed best practice has been developed by the sector, particularly in relation to how ‘fairness’ should be interpreted in relation to elections. One principle that is generally followed is that a Students’ Union should both be fair and be seen to be fair when an existing Sabbatical Officer is running against a student.
In the current context, and for both current referenda, a Sabbatical Officer is leading one campaign and a student is leading the opposing campaign. This requires the Elections team to be particularly vigilant about any perception of the Sabbatical Officer having an innate advantage.
I am satisfied that Elections (“a secret ballot in which all members are entitled to vote”) are sufficient analogous to Referenda (also a secret ballot in which all members are entitled to vote) for the broad provisions to be transferrable.
I believe this is further confirmed by the Cambridge SU By-Laws which state (By-Law 9: Referendums: ss.2.1-2.13) that the Returning Officer and Deputy Returning Officer should run a Referendum in the same manner as an Election.
I therefore do not accept this ground for appeal.
2) The appeal states that Sabbatical Officers are required by By-Law 3:s.3.4 to “campaign for the...interests of students of the University”
I further note that s.3.7 of that same By-Law requires Officers to “act in accordance with decisions taken by referendums”, which potentially creates a tension when Sabbatical Officer are actively campaigning for one side of a referendum.
I understand the frustration that as political leaders of the SU, Sabbatical Officers are both entitled and required to campaign in work time. Should the referendum seeking a full mandate to campaign for the University to divest be successful, I would fully expect the Sabbatical Officers to be campaigning as mandated in work time but I do not believe campaigning to win a referendum to be equivalent.
I therefore do not accept this ground for appeal.
3) The appeal suggests that while the DRO and RO are empowered to interpret the rules of the election, they are not empowered to determine how the Sabbatical Officers’ work time is used. This power, the appeal suggests, lies solely with the Trustee Board.
The Articles state that (s.20.7) “the duties and method of remuneration ...shall be as set out in the By-Laws”. By-Law 3, s.2.1 states that “The working arrangement and employment contracts of the Sabbatical Officers shall be produced by the Board of Trustees”.
There is no doubt that the Returning Officers are not able to change the Officers’ contracts of employment. Nor are they able to influence how the Officers’ work time is spent at any point other than during Elections or Referenda. I believe, however, that if Officers become involved in either of those processes, they become subject to the relevant By-Laws (8 and 9) and so, within the very limited context of Elections or Referenda, the Returning Officers are able to make rulings that affect how the Sabbatical Officers’ work time is used.
The appeal suggests that by approving Sabbatical Officers being campaign leads, implicit approval was granted to use work time to campaign. This is not the case.
I therefore do not accept this ground for appeal.
4) The appeal suggests that the Working Time Regulations 1998 mean that because an employer may only require an employee to take annual leave on specified dates by giving twice as many days’ notice as the duration of the leave, Sabbatical Officers may not be obliged at this stage to take leave.
Sabbatical Officers are not being required to take any leave. The DRO ruling rather means that if they wish to campaign during their normal working hours, they must take leave. They are under no obligation to campaign during work hours, however, and are certainly not being required to take leave for a period of 5 days.
I therefore do not accept this ground for appeal.
However, I do agree that the requirement to take leave in order to campaign on the referenda during work hours would ideally have been communicated well in advance of the referendum. It is unfortunate that the timing has been less than ideal and I acknowledge with regret the stress this may have caused. I will make sure that there is a clear recommendation for future referenda that this does not happen again.
5) The appeal suggests that fairness has not been upheld throughout the process because of the timing of the decision regarding leave and that the decision contradicted what they had been told by staff at Cambridge SU.
As above, I agree that the timing of this decision has been far from ideal and I do fully accept both the stress that may have been caused and the perception of unfairness towards Sabbatical Officers campaigning.
I do not, however, accept that the decision was in any way unfair or undemocratic. The process has, in my judgment, been correctly and fairly followed in relation to the DRO’s decision, albeit regrettably late in the day and after Cambridge SU staff had advised that Sabbatical Officers would not have to take leave.
I am sorry for the stress caused by the DRO’s decision but I do not believe the process to be unfair or undemocratic, just less than ideal in terms of timing.
As above, I do not accept this ground for appeal but will try to ensure this does not happen with future referenda.
Summary
Having carefully considered all points submitted within the appeal, and all supporting documentation, I do not accept the grounds detailed within the appeal. I therefore do not accept the appeal and the DRO’s original ruling stands.